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The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments this week on a variety of issues including if the three chemicals which are used in Florida's lethal injection method of execution cause pain, making the execution of convicted cop killer Clarence Hill cruel and unusual punishment.
Hill was moments away from dying by lethal injection in January when Justice Anthony Kennedy granted a last minute Supreme Court stay. Hill, 48, has been sentenced to die by lethal injection for killing a Pensacola police officer and wounding his partner 23 years ago.
The Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School, which provides free public access to a vast collection of U.S. laws, court decisions and related legal materials on its website at www.law.cornell.edu is now offering free details on high profile cases before they are argued at the nation's high courts.
The synopses of cases currently before the U.S. Supreme Court are written by the editorial board of the liibulletin, the school's electronic journal. The board comprises second and third year law students.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, HABEAS CORPUS, EIGHTH AMENDMENT, LETHAL
INJECTION, STAY OF EXECUTION, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT,
CIVIL RIGHTS
Hill v. McDonough (05-8794)
Oral argument date: April 26, 2006
In this case the Supreme Court faces a sensitive issue involving capital punishment,
intermingled with a complicated procedural question. Although the Petitioner in this case is not challenging his conviction and subsequent death sentence, he is
questioning the method the state of Florida anticipates using for carrying out his
execution. The Court must balance this substantive hot legal topic with the procedural interplay between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights legislation) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus legislation).
The Petitioner's fate will likely turn on how his action should be properly classified-as a civil rights action or a habeas petition. As a civil rights action, the
Court would then decide whether his claim is cognizable under § 1983. As a habeas
petition, the Court may rule his claim barred under § 2254.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-8794.html
CRIMINAL LAW, DURESS, BURDEN OF PROOF, BATTERED WOMAN'S
SYNDROME, FIFTH AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Dixon v. United States (05-7053)
Oral argument date: April 25, 2006
The issue before the Court is whether a criminal defendant raising an affirmative defense of duress must bear the burden of persuasion and prove duress by a
preponderance of the evidence, or, once the defendant has raised the defense, whether the government must bear the burden and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that duress did not exist. Petitioner Dixon argues that the government should bear the burden of persuasion because the duress defense negates the mens rea, or guilty mind, element of the crime, and under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment the government must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including disproving any defenses.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-7053.html
FOURTH AMENDMENT, WARRANTLESS SEARCHES, EVIDENCE
SUPPRESION, EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, EMERGENCY AID
Brigham City v Stuart (05-502)
Oral argument date: April 24, 2006
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
government intrusion by prohibiting unlawful searches and seizures without a warrant. Two related exceptions to this rule are relevant in this case: the emergency aid exception and the exigent circumstance exception. This case will help define the
type of conduct that must occur in order for an officer to validly invoke either the
exigent circumstance or the emergency aid exception. The Court's decision will help sharpen the line between permissible and impermissible police involvement and define the level of protection individuals continue to have under the Fourth Amendment.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-7053.html
IMMIGRATION, ILLEGAL WORKERS, RACKETEERING, RICO
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams (05-465)
Oral argument date: Apr. 26, 2006
Mohawk Industries has been accused of harboring and hiring illegal immigrants in
violation of the RICO Act. To establish a RICO violation, Mohawk's employees must
show that Mohawk and its third-party recruiting agencies constituted an "enterprise"
within the scope of RICO. The district court held that Mohawk's collaboration with the
third-party recruiters sufficiently established an enterprise. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an enterprise under RICO, in
light of the rule that a defendant must "conduct" or "participate in" the affairs of some larger enterprise and not just its own affairs. If the Court affirms, the scope of the enterprise element would be vastly widened, exposing more corporations to RICO liability. But if the Court reverses, the government may find it more difficult to use RICO to control corporations and other similar entities where immigration violations are alleged.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-465.html
JURISDICTION, FEDERALISM, FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION, FEDERAL
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Empire HealthChoice Assurance v. McVeigh (05-200)
Oral argument date: April 25, 2006
This case derives from a reimbursement action brought by Empire HealthChoice
Assurance, a private healthcare provider, against a federal employee who received health care benefits under the terms of a contract brought into being by the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act. The District and Circuit courts held that federal law did not govern the action, and that the action should have been raised under state contract law in state court. The Supreme Court must now decide whether the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act creates a federal common law basis for Empire's claim, and thus whether the federal courts have jurisdiction over cases brought to enforce provisions of contracts created under the Act.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-200.html
JURISDICTION, APPELLATE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS, SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION, SLUSA, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), 15 U.S.C. §77p(b)
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust (05-409)
Oral argument date: April 24, 2006
Petitioners are a group of investors who owned shares in mutual funds offered or advised by respondents, Putnam Funds Trust. These investors brought a class
action suit in Illinois state court asserting breach of fiduciary duty and alleging
that the mutual funds set prices in a way that allowed arbitrageurs to exploit differences in prices to the detriment of long-term investors. The respondents removed the suit to federal court pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). The judge then remanded the case to state court because the petitioners had not alleged a loss "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities" as required under the Act. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), such a remand is not appealable if the remand is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, in conflict with previous decisions by the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, ruled that the remand was reviewable because the basis of the SLUSA remand was not lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does not apply. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders in suits removedunder statutes such as SLUSA.
Continues: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-409.html
4-28-06
© 2006 North
Country Gazette
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