Originally Posted - March 29, 2007




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Lead NTSB Investigator In Ethan Allen Probe Says Evidence Withheld
© The North Country Gazette

By June Maxam

LAKE GEORGE--It was a warm sunny autumn afternoon in Warren County when a group of 47 senior citizens from Michigan and Ohio boarded the 40-foot long tour boat Ethan Allen on Oct. 2, 2005, for a cruise along the shoreline of Lake George to view the vibrant reds and orange hues of the fall foliage.

About 20 minutes into the cruise, the boat capsized, throwing the 47 passengers and the captain into the water. The boat sank in 70 feet of water near Cramer Point. Twenty people died.

Following investigations conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, the Warren County Sheriff's Department and a Warren County Grand Jury, all of which determined no criminal negligence existed, the NTSB investigator-in-charge of the Ethan Allen probe says that the federal investigation was seriously flawed, evidence was withheld and he wants Congress to reopen the investigation.

In fact, if all of the evidence is reviewed, there may be probable cause to bring charges of criminal negligence based on who knew what when.

The Ethan Allen had been scheduled to take the first group of leaf peekers out that Sunday at 1500 hours or 3 p.m. but the director of the tour group asked if the cruise could depart about a half hour early. The tour boat had made two trips earlier in the day and the vessel operators on those cruises, Captain Richard Paris and Hugh Quirk, one of the owners of Shoreline Cruises Inc., later told investigators that the trips had been uneventful.

Richard Paris, 76, a retired state trooper and operator of the vessel, said that in preparation for his trips that day, he had checked the bilge area and did not observe any water of the forward bulkhead. The pump removed bilge water from either the engine compartment itself or the forward space, according to the setting on a selector value.

Quirk said that he had arrived at Shoreline between 7:45 and 8 a.m. that Sunday and the "first thing I did was check out the Ethan Allen".

"I climbed into the engine room and checked the bilges, the oil and transmission fluids….I sat in the engine room and checked everything. It was the first time I had ever been in there".

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) immediately sent a team of investigators to the accident scene. Leading the NTSB team of 12 was Robert Ford who served as the Investigator-in-Charge. NTSB. Acting Chairman Mark Rosenker accompanied the team and served as principal spokesperson.

Less than 10 months after the accident, on July 25, 2006, the final NTSB report was presented in Washington, DC., with the NTSB maintaining that the capsizing was the result of a series of factors that occurred.

Both Paris and Quirk say that they didn't notice a list or tipping of the Ethan Allen as it departed on the cruise and didn't notice it as being "bow heavy". But the NTSB final report concluded the boat had a 2 degree list to port when it left the dock.

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the capsizing of the Ethan Allen was the vessel's insufficient stability to resist the combined forces of a passing wave or waves, a sharp turn, and the resulting involuntary shift of passengers to the port side of the vessel. The vessel's stability was insufficient because it carried 48 persons where post-accident stability calculations demonstrated that it should have been permitted to carry only 14 persons. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the failure to reassess the vessel's stability after it had been modified because there was no clear requirement to do so", the NTSB report issued in late July, 2006, concluded.
NTSB - Marine Accident Report
NTSB - Stability Safety IssuesStability Issues
NTSB - Ethan Allen Presentation (Power Point)

Now Ford, the investigator-in-charge of the NTSB probe, says the report is flawed and has asked for a Congressional investigation into the NTSB's handling of the matter, alleging that crucial evidence was withheld from the final report which could give cause to bring charges of criminal negligence in the case. He wants the case reopened.

Although a detailed file was sent in early February by Ford to both Congressman James Oberstar, (D-Minnesota) chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and Congressman Frank Wolf (R-Virginia) a member of the Congressional Appropriations and Transportation Committee, only Wolfe has acknowledged Ford's request.

Wolf told Ford that he had contacted Oberstar on his behalf and requested that Ford's questions and concerns be addressed. Wolf has said that as soon as he had received any information about the matter, he would contact Ford. So far, Ford has had no acknowledgement from Oberstar's office except for receiving his return mail receipt.

Attempts by The North Country Gazette to contact Oberstar's office about Ford's request were also unsuccessful.

As the senior Democrat on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Oberstar serves as an Ex Officio member of the House subcommittees on Aviation, Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation, Public Buildings & Economic Development, Railroads, Surface Transportation, and Water Resources & Environment.

A 530-page report issued by Warren County Sheriff Larry Cleveland summarizing the the sheriff's department investigation had concluded that "no culpable criminal conduct had occurred" although Ford's allegations supported by documentation indicates that the sheriff's department investigation of the matter was also seriously flawed and an investigator sent to South Carolina to observe testing on the boat's pumps admitted to NTSB investigators he was out of his league and didn't know what he was observing. http://tcattorney.typepad.com/wrongfuldeath/2006/02/docs_received_b.html

Paris and Shoreline Cruises pleaded guilty earlier this week to a misdemeanor charge of violating the state's Navigation Law by failing to have more that one crew member on board. Paris and his employer were indicted by a Warren County Grand Jury. Warren County district attorney Kate Hogan said that the law had prevented her from bringing charges of criminal negligence in the case based on the known evidence.

But Ford says that evidence was withheld and if the investigation is reopened and all of the evidence reviewed, particularly that involving the replacement and installation of a water pump just months before the accident, it could constitute grounds to bring criminal negligence charges.

The NTSB contracted an independent naval architect firm to provide detailed stability data and information from the Ethan Allen, Ford says. Using the data, the staff expected to explain how and why the vessel capsized. Based on the results of the firm's study, one factor by itself would not have been sufficient to cause the capsizing. Therefore, if any of the factors cannot be supported, the probable cause is flawed, Ford says.

He says such is the case with the Ethan Allen investigation.

Ford was a marine accident investigator in the Office of Marine Safety (OMS) at NTSB from February 2001 until March 2006. During this period, he was an investigator for a number of high-profile marine accidents including the explosion on the Norwegian Cruise Line vessel Norway at the Port of Miami, the collision of the Staten Island Ferry Andrew J. Barberi and the sinking of the U.S. fishing vessel Arctic Rose.

He was either project manager or group chairman for a number of small passenger vessel accidents. His final accident investigation was as the investigator-in-charge during the on-scene portion of the Ethan Allen investigation. He resigned from the agency last March, saying he felt the "management of the office was more concerned with the timely production of a report rather than on conducting a thorough investigation. I believe the final report into the capsizing of the Ethan Allen was produced with the focus on timeliness and that there are significant flaws in the investigation".

There were a lot of politics involved too, he says, especially with the appointment of Dr. John "Jack" Spencer as NTSB's director of the Office of Marine Safety in August, 2005, two months before the Ethan Allen tragedy.

In summarizing what he maintains are the vulnerable areas of the NTSB's final report, Ford says that the report relied on "cherry-picked" information from interviews. He says that interviews to the Warren County Sheriff's office that he had entered into the public docket before he left the federal agency were removed before the release of the docket. The deleted information would have contradicted the investigation conclusions in the published report, according to Ford.

Ford also charges says that crucial video and photographic evidence was not entered into the docket and was not addressed in the report that could have contradicted the report's findings.

Importantly, in regard to the gap found in the boat's water pump, Ford says there was no analysis of the destructive testing conducted on two raw water coolant pumps that had been installed on the Ethan Allen.

"Assumptions were made regarding the waterline of the pump in relation to the centerline of raw water pump without further documentation in the report", Ford charges and he has provided documentation to Oberstar's office that addresses specific factors found in the report.

Ford contends that if the NTSB can release one report that is superficial and flawed, the integrity of the entire organization is at stake. "Who will represent the interests of the victims and families if the NTSB loses the trust of the public", Ford asks and he has asked Oberstar in his capacity as chairman of the transportation committee to reconsider the investigation into the capsizing and sinking of the Ethan Allen.

There are six issues to be addressed in the final NTSB report, Ford points out, which include the two degree port list, the Ethan Allen making a sharp turn and allegedly heeling to port in the turn. He takes issue with the NTSB's assertion that passenger statements were consistent regarding turn to starboard and a passing wave, that there was an "insignificant" amount of water in bilges and the analysis of the raw water coolant pump.

In his summary of dissent, Ford notes that the two degree port list was disputed by the captains of the Ethan Allen and its sister boat, the de Champlain. Video and still photographs which may have provided additional information were not entered into docket nor evaluated, he says.

He points out that passenger statements were inconsistent whether the Ethan Allen was in a turn to port or starboard. The captain of the Ethan Allen was consistent in his statements that he had, at best, just begun the turn to starboard. Paris also stated that the vessel, at most, would heel slightly in a turn.

Ford says that there was no consistency among the passengers as to whether they were struck by a passing wave as it has been claimed.

More troubling, there was no explanation as to how the raw water bilge pump developed a gap in its housing and there was no analysis to evaluate the destructive testing conducted at the NTSB laboratory. The information in the factual report would seem to indicate the Ethan Allen was experiencing some vibration, Ford says. How would vibration influence bolts to the raw water pump, he asks.

The NTSB report says that when the overloaded Ethan Allen departed the dock, it already had a 2.20 list to port, which would have reduced the vessel's port freeboard and limited the maximum angle of roll to port that the vessel could sustain before the deck edge submerged. In addition, the vessel had almost one foot of trim by the bow when it sailed, according to the report.

Ford points out contradictions to these assertions. The list was determined during the stability assessment performed by a contracted Naval Architect firm. The port list was based on the load model of the vessel using passenger weights that in most cases were estimates. Interviews contradicted the existence of a list, he shows with documentation.

William Perry, captain of the de Champlain, an eyewitness to the Ethan Allen departing the marina, was interviewed on Oct. 7, 2005.

    Q. Could you tell anything about the boat, was the boat down below the head or by the stem have a list on it?

    A. No, it didn't appear to have any unusual, unusual visual quality that I noticed based on the, you know, number of people. It was on its normal position from what I could see from -- for that.

    Q. Would it be normal to have a list or down by the head or starboard-

    A. Backing out in close proximity to the dock where there's very little -- water turbulence, perfectly calm, it looked perfectly normal to me. It didn't appear to be out of normal.

    Paris told NTSB investigators on Oct. 11, 2005:

    Q. Okay. Do you recall that day if the boat was ever -- was down by the head or had a list on it when you loaded the boat? Do you recall when you -- you're back (indiscernible) but once you got on your way, do you recall the boat being down by the head or having a list?

    A. It didn't have a list. I know that.

    Q. Okay. So you didn't notice either a list or -

    A. No. I would not have left if the boat was like leaning over. I don't like to drive them like that. It's like driving a car with two flat tires on the same side, you know, your car's going down the road like that.

    Q. Do you recall if the boat was down to the stern at all?

    A. No.

    Q. SO the boat was basically level on two planes?

    A. Basically, yeah.

Ford says that a video was provided to NTSB investigators with footage of the Ethan Allen departing Shoreline marina for the accident voyage. The video was not entered into the docket and was not referenced in report. He questions if the video footage would support NTSB report regarding port list, or was it intentionally omitted because it does not support the NTSB conclusions.

According to the sheriff's report, there was a "video" of the Ethan Allen departing on the cruise, taken by the weather cam of Capital News 9. According to the sheriff's department, the video is actually individual pictures with at least a 30 second time delay between photos which production crews link together for the web cast.

In a memo written on Oct. 4, 2005, by sheriff's investigator Maurice Aldrich to Sheriff Cleveland and Sgt. James LaFarr of the investigative division, Chris Brunner, Capital News 9 news director, had said that while the name of the boat can't be distinguished in the photos, the time and location of the images was consistent with what had been stated by the sheriff's department. The photos don't appear to be included in the sheriff's report.

While there's mention in the sheriff's department of the video showing the Ethan Allen departing, there's no mention of it in the NTSB report.

Ford says he recalls the sheriff's department providing NTSB with the photos made from the video and that NTSB with all of its technical expertise should have been able to enhance and slow down the video to show the vessel departing.

There's also a letter from a Steve Gibbon of Chattanooga, TN indicating that he had provided digital photos to the sheriff's department of the Ethan Allen had taken less than 10 minutes before the capsizing from the Mohican, owned by the Lake George Steamboat Company, but these are not included in either the NTSB or sheriff's report--or at least they're not identified as being from Gibbons. Gibbons says his photos are time stamped---the photos in the report are not.

Ford says that the Gibbons photos were time-stamped but he had incorrectly entered the time by one hour. However, Ford says that the Gibbon photos match up with the statements made by the captain of the Mohican and they coincide with events of the day.

"Would the photos have shed any additional light on the capsizing?" Ford asks. "Why weren't the photos entered into the docket?"

The NTSB report indicates that the operator of the Ethan Allen attempted to maneuver the vessel in a sharp starboard turn to head into the waves which Paris and others say were generated by the Mohican, but Paris didn't complete the maneuver before the wave or waves hit the vessel.

Ford points out that interview statements given by Paris contradict that the boat was in a sharp turn during the chain of events leading to the capsizing.

    Q. Okay. So can you tell me roughly the, the heading where you're pointing, the heading of the boat when you actually---

    A. Just, just, I just turned the wheel.

    Q. Okay

    A. To, to bring the bow

    Q. So you're----

    (Simultaneous comments)

    Q. Were you on northerly heading say at that point>

    A. Yeah. See Lake George doesn't run actual north and south. It runs northeast and southwest.

    Q. So you. were you were aiming at----

    A. I was just---the bow really didn't get to swing.

    Q. Okay.

    A Because the weight of the boat.

    Q. Okay.

    A Which is normal. It's a -

    Q. But when, when you did-

    (Simultaneous comments.)

    A When I started, that's when the wave hit me, and from there on in, it's-

    Q. Okay.

    A -- you can -

    Q. Okay. So at the point where you started turning, did you put the rudder hard over?

    A. No.

    Q. No?

    A Just -- well, it (indiscernible) turn but that's not hard rudder. That's all I had a chance to do.

    Q. Okay. When you, when you turned and you saw these waves and you -were you headed into them?

    A I normally head in-

    Q. Perpendicular to-

    A -- put the bow into them.

    A. I had gone in close to shore a little bit because I think as I said before there are a couple of fairly nice camps, and I wanted to give them a little view of it. And as soon as I got where I had to make, start my turn -

    Q. Okay.

    A. -- I just swung, just started to go right with the wheel, and that's when that wave slammed me on the stern.

    Q. And what, what actions did you take at that point?

    A. Well, as I say, I cut the wheel. I didn't have time. This, again we're talking seconds here, to get it all the way over, the rudder all the way over before I got hit, and that wave, angle it was coming it, it follows right down the starboard side of the boat. So eventually it had caught the whole boat.

    Q. Okay. So did you -- did the rudder as best (indiscernible) turn actually make the stops or hit the stops? Did you-

    A. No. I never got it all the way over.

    Q. Never got -

    A. No.

    Q. Are there -- is there a hard stop on the rudder when you -

    A. It will stop, yes, but it's probably at least two complete turns before - get that far.

    Q. And you made those two complete turns in rapid succession, would you say?

    A. I didn't have a chance to do them on this instance.

    Q. Okay.

    A. No.

    Q. So normally, normally the full stop would be two complete turns, that's the normal full range?

    A. Yeah. It depends how much you're turning. If you're just -- out a little -you don't put it all the way over.

    Q. No, of course. The full -

    A. Yeah.

    Q. -- travel two complete turns.

    A. You know the only time you really put it over full travel either port or starboard is when you're docking.

    Q. Okay.

    A. If you get a little tricky wind there and -

    Q. Okay, so how, how much, how many turns do you think you made before the boat actually-

    A. I would say maybe half or three-quarters of a turn at the most.

    Q. And do you recall how the boat responded at that point when you started making the turn?

    A. Well, before the wave?

    Q. Before the wave.

    A. Okay, this -

    Q. You, you-

    A. -- was almost -

    Q. You saw the wave.

In addressing a third issue, the vessel heeled to port while making the turn, the NTSB report says the Ethan Allen's characteristics on the day of the accident met criteria that would have predicted the vessel's rolling outboard as the operator turned the vessel into the approaching wave(s). The vessel's high center of gravity created a significant heeling moment that tended to roll the vessel outboard in a turn. In this condition, the vessel had low GM and reserve righting energy to resist heeling moments. The vessel was designed with a fine bow and full transom, and would have had a significant asymmetric water plane at the accident condition draft. This asymmetry would have caused the Ethan Allen to trim forward as it rolled to the side, the published report says.

This would have increased the bow-down aspect of the vessel with its existing one-foot static trim. While the Ethan Allen rolled to port as a result of the operator turning the vessel to starboard, the magnitude of the roll is unknown, the NTSB findings say.

However, Ford points to the existing contradictions to the NTSB conclusion, primarily that Paris has contradicted the assertion that the vessel would heel during a turn.

    A. That boat won't lean when you're turning.

    Q. Okay

    A. I don't care how many people are on it. They won't lean over.

    Q. Okay

    A. From that, you know, like a runabout will lean into the turn, well, these boats don't lean in or out really.

    Q. Okay.

    A. Unless you really had to whip it for an -- all the way for your two, two and a half turns, whatever it is.

    Q. Okay.

    A. And I'm not too sure they would lean over that way either. Maybe very minimal.

    Q. Okay. So you saw the wave coming on your starboard quarter, and then you started to make the turn with the wheel, and you made a half to three quarters of a turn

    A. Yes, and that's when I got slammed.

    Q. So you would never feel for whether it heels inboard or outboard (indiscernible)?

    A. It wouldn't heel---say I turned to the starboard hard, it would lean over a little bit to the port, a little bit

    Q. Okay

    A. It's not like those runabouts that they'll heel over right into they turn, you know.

Ford also compares the statements of the passengers and argues with the NTSB report that says the statements were consistent regarding the turn to starboard and passing wave.

NTSB concluded that passenger and witness reports were consistent that just before the accident, the operator turned the vessel to starboard. NTSB says Paris told investigators that he had begun to turn the vessel at Cramer Point to proceed along the route of the vessel's tour, and that he continued the turn when he saw a wave about to strike the vessel. Paris' sharp turn was an attempt to meet the wave head on which would have enabled him to better handle the force exerted by the wave. According to the NTSB report, some witnesses reported that as the vessel turned starboard, the wave struck the vessel broadside, on its aft starboard quarter, before the vessel could be turned into the wave. Therefore, the Safety Board concluded that the attempt of Paris turning the vessel into the oncoming wake before the capsizing was a normal reaction to the circumstances, but not timely enough to be effective.

Ford rebuts this NTSB conclusion too, providing a table of excerpts of statements made to sheriff's department investigators. Ford says he had entered the interviews into the NTSB docket before he left the agency but the released docket does not include the statements and there is no mention of the interviews in the report, asserting they were intentionally removed. He says the passenger assessments ranged from turns to the left, turns to the right, a violent rocking and others that didn't know what happened. "Where is the consistency in the passenger statements", Ford asks, again contradicting the NTSB findings with known evidence.

The final version of the NTSB report says the nature of the capsizing led investigators to question whether water had been in the hull, which might have degraded the stability of the vessel. The bilge was among the items that the operator was to check at the start of each day. He indicated that he checked the bilge that morning and found nothing unusual. He was the second operator to captain the Ethan Allen, Hugh Quirk being the first, and the bilge check he completed would have been the second one conducted on the vessel on the day of the accident. Consistent with the company requirement, Quirk, the first operator also checked the bilge, and he said that he found nothing unusual.

Conclusion 6 of the NTSB report said that at the time of the accident, the bilge might have contained, at most, an insignificant amount of water, which would not have affected the Ethan Allen's stability but Ford takes issue with that finding too based on the existing evidence.

He points out that the Ethan Allen made three trips on Oct. 2, 2005. The first trip was operated by Hugh Quirk, the owner's brother. He says he checked the bilges before his 9:30 a.m. trip. The second check of the bilges was made by Captain Paris before he operated the vessel on the 10:30 a.m. trip. The bilges were not checked before the accident trip and the captain made this clear in the Oct. 11 interview of him. How can the NTSB justify that there was an insignificant amount of water in bilges based on the most recent check that was four hours before the accident trip, Ford asks.

    Q. So you started the motor around 2:40 then?

    A. Roughlv. Give or take, yeah. Again, check the exhaust, make sure she's pumping. I always do that.

    Q. Okay.

    A. Before every trip I make. If I make five trips a day, I -- soon as I start the engine, I make sure -- the pump is working.

    Q. And did you just eyeball the bilges again at this point?

    A. No.

Ford says that one passenger believed that there was water in the bilges. Lawrence Mahalak, a retired engineer from Ford Motor Company, was interviewed by NTSB investigators on Oct. 11, 2005.

"I said that I have a 16-foot boat now. I've had a 23-foot sailboat and I have a canoe, and I'm also a wind sailor, so I'm familiar with strange attitudes of boats. And I have---and I had at my dock a couple of years ago, where it would fill up with rain, and my procedure for dumping it was to get in the boat gently, get the motor started, pull the drain plug out and drive it until the water all drained out. When you get on a boat that's half full of water, it acts very sluggish and unstable about the roll axis. The boat that we were on, the Ethan Allen, acted to me like it had a lot of water in the bilge", Mahalak said in his statement.

In the NTSB report, an analysis of the raw water coolant pump was given saying that given the low leak rate of the pump, the two independent checks of the bilge by the operator, and the lack of any other possible source of water ingress, it is unlikely that a noticeable amount of water was in the bilge at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that at the time of the accident, the bilge might have contained, at most, an insignificant amount of water, which would not have affected the Ethan Allen's stability.

Ford has registered strong dissent to this analysis, arguing that the raw water coolant pump, hereafter referred to as the accident pump, was found during the on-scene investigation to have a gap between the pump housing and bearing housing. The accident pump was installed June or July 2005. The accident pump and replaced pump were taken to the NTSB laboratory. Testing on the pump was conducted at the Cummins' Charleston, S.C., facility in December 2005.

Ford says he attended the Charleston testing and remembers the WCSD investigator that attended. He said the county investigator "really had no clue as to what was going on and admitted it. The analysis of the testing is the heart of the flaw in the NTSB final analysis. It was poor investigative work".

"In the docket, there are comments from party members that all claim the pump was above the waterline of vessel. This is where I disagree. The pump, once passengers were loaded, was below waterline, meaning water would gravitate into bilge while at dock. A photo was taken in December, 2005 at the Cummins facility depicts Cummins performing a measurement using alcohol to indicate the level of the pump in relation to the green bottom paint of the boat. Shoreline claimed the water line would have been below the level of pump. The photo is truly evidence that proved the pump was above waterline and should have been in docket", Ford says. PHOTO

The position that the pump could not have leaked water into the bilges is based on the assertion that the pump center was above the waterline, Ford says. Shoreline Cruises in its Party Submission to the NTSB, claimed on page 7 that "As predicted when this matter emerged, any theory that this gap in the raw pump would have resulted in an inflow of water into the bilge was discredited. The pump was unable to retain suction, in that the supply water level of the water entering the pump would have been below the centerline of the pump, and suction would not have been maintained."

Ford says that Shoreline dismisses the pump as a factor with "Accordingly, the idea of a gap in the water pump contributing, in any manner, to the capsizing of the vessel should receive no further consideration by the NTSB".

Cummins' technical review stated that the raw water pump centerline was above lake level at all times, even with the vessel fully loaded. Thus there would have been no opportunity for gravity flow from the lake into the bilge via the gap in the pump." Hypro also stated in its review that the pump as located above the waterline when the Ethan Allen was fully loaded. Therefore, when the vessel was sitting at the dock and the engine not running, water could not enter through the gap on the suction side of the pump, according to Ford.

However, Ford points out, the NTSB report does not provide any technical information providing the height of the pump in relation to the water line. What was the height of the pump in relation to the green bottom paint of the Ethan Allen for both loaded and unloaded conditions? How did all the party members determine that the waterline was below the center of the pump and why is there no documentation to support the claim?

Mahalak, the retired engineer, claims that the entire bottom paint of Ethan Allen was not visible while passengers were boarding, Ford says. If bottom paint was not exposed, would the centerline of the pump been below the waterline? This issue was not analyzed, he emphasizes.

In a statement to NTSB, Mahalak said that he noticed the boat was heavy in the front prior to the time he got on where he was along the side of the boat.

    A. And I was looking at the hoat and I noticed that there was no waterline painted on it.

    Q. Okay.

    A. No bottom paint. Because normally, if there's bottom paint on it, you can see how heavily its loaded and I noticed that the boat was loaded heavily in the front, but there was no bottom paint on it so you couldn't tell.

    Q. Okay.

    A. You couldn't tell where the normal waterline was. There was no stripe on the side of the boat, it was just white.

    Q. Okay.

    A. You couldn't tell where the normal waterline was. There was no stripe on the side of the boat, it was just white.

The NTSB laboratory conducted an examination on the replaced and replacement (accident) pump and the report was entered into the docket. However, Ford says there was no analysis to explain the findings.

"It's a fact that post accident the pump housing was found with a gap in it. When did it happen? How did it occur? Was there a connection between the pump that was replaced about two months earlier and the accident pump?", Ford asks. The NTSB docket includes a Materials Laboratory Factual Report on the replaced and accident raw water pump. There was no analysis of the factual report in the final NTSB report. Information in the report indicated an issue with the bolts on the pump housing loosening. Why was this issue not addressed in the report?".

NEXT: The replacement of Ethan Allen's pump just months before the accident, politics within the NTSB, inexperience of sheriff's department investigators, testing of the pump, discovery by NTSB of gap in the water pump and a member of the Quirk family had made allegations that a representative of NYS Parks and Recreation had acted improperly in the engine room during the NTSB investigation.
3-29-07

© 2007 North Country Gazette


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